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Abstract. This essay recounts campaigns against  privacy; the fortifications erected 
against them; and hi-jinx attributable to hackers, crackers, and miscreants under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act. 
1. Introduction 
Hell is living on earth without love. 
                                                Dwellers feel empty inside. 
                                                Monotony is a curse. But…… 
 
America is changing.1 Cyberspace blankets the continent. A new generation is at the nation’s helm. Citizens are 
making weird accommodations with their surroundings.2 Privacy is under siege.3 People are anxious, fearful, and 
unsettled. Cyberspace makes things worst.  
 
Like nature, in the past, cyberspace is indifferent to the antics of man. But cyberspace technology, when put 
in the wrong hands, is threatening and unfriendly.4 Business computers prowl the landscape to compile data 
about us.5 Government software spies on people to trap law breakers.6 This essay recounts campaigns against  
privacy; the fortifications erected against them; and hi-jinx attributable to hackers,7 crackers,8 and miscreants 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.9 
                                                          
1
 REICH, GREENING OF AMERICA 2-6 (1970); MARCUSE, NEGATION 33-34 (1968). Man is the original actor. He makes history. 
He chooses sides and acts. 
2
 REICH, supra note 1, at 8. 
3
 Chick, Customary International Law: Creating a Body of Customary Law for Cyberspace. Part 2: Applying Custom as Law 
to the Internet Infrastructure, 26 COMPUTER LAW & SECURITY REVIEW 185,193 (2010) (trolling search engine data bases 
(Google, Yahoo, and America Online) for academic reasons is suspect); Hafner & Richtel,Google Resists U.S. Subpoena of 
Search Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at A-1 (digging into ISP log files (i.e., asking providers to surrender the records for 
every person accessing a particular internet website) is a bit much); Electronic Frontier Foundation, From EEF’s Secret 
Files: Anatomy of a Bogus Subpoena, http://www.eff.org/wp/anatomy-bogus-subpeona-indymedia (last visited Sept. 9, 
2011).  
4
 Aquilina, Public Security Versus Privacy in Technology Law: A Balancing Act, 26 COMPUTER LAW & SECURITY REVIEW 
130 (2010) [hereinafter Aquilina]. 
5
. McClung, A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 N.W.U. 
L.REV 63, 69 (2003) [hereinafter McClung]; Keck, Cookies, the Constitution, and the Common Law: A Framework for the 
Right to Privacy on the Internet, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 83, 109 (2002); see Online Profiling: Benefits and Concerns, 
Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Jodie 
Bernstein, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Protection, F.T.C.), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/onlineprofile.htm.  
6
 People get shoved into the spotlight, indeed, find themselves put there by a swirl of events, politics, psychology, and 
emotions. What the government does under the Patriot Act is a horrifying example. American Civil Liberties Union, 
Surveillance Under the USA Patriot Act, available at http://www.aclu.org/National-Security/surveillance-under-usa-patriot-
act; see Aquilina, supra note 4, at 133; see also Shipler, Free to Search and Seize, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2011, at A-21. 
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2. Sketch 
Cyberspace is a parallel universe.10 It is electrons, computers, routers, servers, local networks, clouds, webs, and 
super highways (nets) transporting information everywhere. The realm looks like an old growth forest. People 
dart in an out to trap information to solve problems.  
 
Cyberspace is lawless.11 It is indifferent to folks poaching data from others. Today’s users demand privacy: 
patches of ground that accommodate images (self-constructed ones),12 anonymity (things people want to keep 
secret),13 solitude (peace and quiet),14 and rights (claims against others).15  
 
Rummaging through a computer is suspect.16 Using a computer to poach data from other computers is a 
wrong.17 Using webs to bully others is suspect.18 Using them to goad somebody into taking their life is a crime.19 
Assuming somebody’s identity is wicked.20 Using a server to download proprietary information is suspect.21 
Selling the stuff to foreign governments is a crime.22 
3. Landscape 
3.1. Future Shock 
Let’s ease onto the landscape. In my lifetime books and television made indifference to suffering unfashionable. 
E-commerce made old fashioned deal-making obsolete. Machines performed tasks that took older generations 
time to complete.23 Robotics changed everything.24  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7
 Sinrod & Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical Approach to the Application of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 181 (2000). 
8
 Id. at 182. 
9
 Pintos v. Experian Info. Solutions, 605 F.3d 666 (9th Cir 2010); see FTC Releases Survey of Identity Theft in the U.S., 27.3 
Million victims in the Past 5 years, Billions in losses for Businesses and Consumers (Sept. 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/09/idtheft.htm.  
10 Hardy, Law and the Internet, 5 BUS. LAW TODAY 8 (1996). 
11 Rho, Blackbeard of the Twentieth Century: Holding Cybercriminals Liable under the Alien Torts Statute, 7 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 
695, 713-74 (2007). 
12
 Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness,11 BERKLEY TECH. 
L.J. 1, 78 (1996). 
13
 Lester, The Reinvention of Privacy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, vol. 284, no. 3, at 27, 31-32 (Mar. 2001). 
14
 See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). Business webs create no-fly zones above their owners’ space. When 
folk enter their realms they have a right to police a nuisance. See Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of Self- Help in 
Cyberspace, 1 J. L. ECON. & POL. 147 (2005). 
15
 See Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbright, Inc., 739 F.Supp.2d 927 (E.D.Va. 2010). 
16 Invading a reality created by a computer is a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2011).  Looting data is wrongdoing.  Paradigm 
v. Celeritas, 722 F.Supp. 2d 1250 (D.Kan. 2011).  
17
 Lawson, The Case of the Stolen WI-FI, PC WORLD, Aug. 8, 2005, available at 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/122153/the-case-of-the-stolen-wifi.htlm.  
18
 See Chaffin, The New Playground Bullies of Cyberspace: Online Peer Sexual Harassment, 51 HOW. L. J. 773 (2008). 
19
 Breuer, Cyber-Bullying Suicide Case Goes to Jury, available at 
http://www.people.com/people/article/0,202242541,00.html [hereinafterBreuer]. 
20 Folsom,Defining Cyberspace (Finding Real Virtue in Place of Virtual reality), 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 75, 105 
(2007). 
21 Multiven v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 725 F.Supp. 2d 887 (N.D.Cal. 2010). 
22
 Ngowi, Ex-Tech Worker in Mass. Pleads Guilty in Spy Case, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 30, 2011, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9PEMJCG0.htm. 
23
 GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 293 (1967). 
24
 THROW, THE ZERO SUM SOLUTION 146-147, 157 (1985). 
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Machines did the work of fifty men and freed-up labor to do other things. When software of all sorts was 
added to these machines (ordered by handlers to collate data and do other things) the machines did other things 
on their own.25  
 
Then, like now, bits of code roamed untethered to anything.26 When they collided with other bits they created 
intelligence---altering machines results and the cyberspace dweller’s perceptions of his surroundings.27 
 
Input errors and exaggerations made cyber space different.28 During the sub-prime mortgage crisis 
authorities used unsuitable machines to account for the bad stuff swamping us. Government tools were 
overwhelmed by a blizzard of information. Nobody accounted for the economic activity of every sub-prime 
mortgage, or added-in the law of probabilities, to fix the useful life of sub-primes after bundling.29 Something 
had to be done. Hackers came to our rescue.  
3.2 Subprime Mortgages 
These were heady days. Financial institutions trawled oceans, stocked with ordinary beings, to snare some to 
mortgages that fleeced them.30 The mortgages were dumped into mortgage pools managed by agents.31 They 
bundled a bunch; branded them bonds; and sold them downstream.32 Smart investors bought the worst of the lot 
and good insurance to cover the risk that some would fail before maturity.33  
 
Brokers and buyers traded heavily in subprime mortgages.34 Pool agents grabbed the best mortgages for 
bundling.35 Buyers took them to Moody’s for upgrade and passed them on to others. Sadly, the values ascribed to 
ordinary bonds and sub-prime bonds were difficult to distinguish.36 Though both carried an A-1 rating the latter 
was brimming with risk.  
 
The mortgage market process was a cyclical activity.37 Agents compiled the worst mortgages last.38 When 
the worst sub-primes blew up en masse, chunks of the ordinary bond market blew up with them.39 Insurance 
companies stepped up to cover the losses, but couldn’t do so on a sustained basis.40 Discerning a crisis, 
bondholders panicked and, as bond values dropped, the bond market lost its luster as a place where people could 
make piles of money. 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Yudkowsk, Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk, in Global Catastrophic Risks, Sec. 7 
(Aug. 31 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
26
 Id.  
27
 Id. 
28 Benner, Navigating Subprime Securities, CNN MONEY, Aug. 23, 2007, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/22/news/companies/value_subprime_securities.fortune/index.htm. 
29
 Michael Malloy, Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law (University of the Pacific, U.S.A.), Briefing at the Athens 
(Greece) Institute for Education and Research’s 8th Annual Conference on Law (July 19, 2011) [hereinafter Malloy]. 
30
 Id.; see Lewis, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 10 (2010) [hereinafter Lewis]. 
31
 Malloy, supra note 29. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Lewis, supra note 30, at 75. 
34 Malloy, supra note 29. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Lewis, supra note 30, at 74. 
37
 Malloy, supra note 29. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Lewis, supra note 30, at 250-52. There is a longer account in the author’s epilogue. See id. at 253-64. 
40
 Doherty, The Pebble and the Pool: The (Global) Expansion of Sub-prime Litigation 5; Andrews Class Action Litigation 
Rept. 2, 12 (2008). 
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Accountants were supposed to account for the economic activity of every mortgage in the sub-prime market. 
They didn’t do that.41 Pool managers were supposed to file informational reports with the IRS. They were lax.42 
Somebody was supposed to file reports about the bonds with the bondholders, but no one did that.43 Taxpayers 
filed incomplete tax returns. The IRS (working with unsuitable machines) could not catch mistakes. Hacking into 
private computers to get at the truth was difficult. Things were a mess. Hackers came to our rescue. 
3.3 Trade Secrets 
Then, like now, cyberspace was dazzling. It accommodated everyone: good guys, bad guys, villains, and 
mavericks. Some polluted the environment (gumming up servers so others could not use them.) Some overran 
business security systems. Giving victims notice about what they had done, they demand ransoms for promises 
not to do anything else.44 
 
Trade secrets (corporate business aspirations, industrial plans, ways for doing things, product recipes owners 
did not want others to have) were everywhere.45 Companies used non-disclosure agreements against current and 
former employees to discourage stealing.46 Appropriators-succumbing to bribery, theft, and espionage-were 
shamed by their employer, branded social outcasts, and made felons.47  
 
Sadly, human nature, being what it is, remained the same. Thieves planted software in computers to steal 
things. But, curiously enough, their fancy stuff had flaws allowing others to pilfer their stores. In 1996, the 
Economic Espionage Act came onto the scene.48 Congress did something to stop the stealing. It was unlawful to 
pilfer information and sell it to others for profit.49 The loot was called trade secrets. It was defined by examples. 
Selling the stuff to foreign governments was a crime.50   
4. The Rubbish 
The United States was a mess. There was crime, angst, anxiety, and mass unemployment.51 This potage was 
attributable to the subprime mortgage crisis and the top-down policies of the nation’s elite.52 The Bush 
Administration tax cuts (that consumed the government’s budget surplus), two unfunded wars (contributing to 
gross deficit spending by government), and a runaway financial sector (empowered by reckless deregulation) did 
awful things to us.53  
 
People were nostalgic. They pined for the certainty and security of the past. Some turned on acquaintances 
(treating them like prey) to get a foothold in life. In this climate, hurting somebody---by stealing information  
 
                                                          
41
 Joseph McKinney, Professor of Law (Decedents Estates and Tax), College of Law, Washburn University (Topeka, Kansas, 
U.S.A.), Interview with author, June 25, 2011. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Brenner & Schwerha, Cyber Havens, 17 BUS. L. TODAY 49 (2007) [hereinafter Brenner]. 
45
 Rustad, The Negligent Enablement of Trade Secret Misappropriations, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 
455, 508-10 (2010) [hereinafter Rustad]; see Lewis, The Economic Espionage Act and the Threat of Chinese Espionage in 
the United States, 8 CHI-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 189, 201 (2009) [hereinafter Espionage]. 
46
 Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261 301-04 (1998). 
47
 Two Men Plead Guilty to Stealing Trade Secrets from Silicon Valley Cos. To Benefit China, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dec. 14, 
2006, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/yePlea.htm.  
48
 Rustad, supra note 45, at 464-68. 
49
 U.S. v. Kai-Lo Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1998). 
50
 Id. 
51
 Krugman, The Unwisdome of Elites, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2011, at A-23. 
52
 Id.  
53
 Id. 
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from their computers---was swashbuckling, heroic, romantic, un-policed and profitable. Authorities used laws to 
stop them. 
4.1. Harm 
Computers are like books. When employers proscribe employee use, opening one is a crime. Opening computers 
to read or alter privileged information is a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).54 Opening 
one to share proprietary information is suspect. Giving the data to rivals is a crime.55 
1. Gast Case 
Jeffery Gast was a Shamrock Foods Company employee. He signed a confidentiality agreement promising not to 
disclose trade secrets.56 Gast was a good employee. He was offered and accepted a promotion with his employer 
because of his hard work. On January 4, 2008, he sent his employer’s confidential and proprietary information to 
his computer. A day later he told Shamrock about a rival food company’s offer of employment.57 He told 
Shamrock that he was going to work for them.58 On January 14, 2008, he submitted his resignation. A short time 
later Shamrock conducted a forensic audit and discovered an email Gast sent to himself.59  
 
Untethered proprietary information (susceptible to capture by rivals) was (in Shamrock’s mind) a threat to 
the firm. Shamrock brought an action against Gast to recover damages for the cost of the forensic audit under the 
CFAA.60 The question was: whether Gast’s deed clashed with the statute. After a careful consideration of the 
pertinent cases, the court said no. Because Gast was a full-time employee and authorized to use company 
computers, using one to send data to himself was allowable under the law.61 
 
Though Shamrock’s lawsuit made the firm feel good; cast a pall over the food business for a while; chilled a 
rival’s impulse to use their stuff; it left the plaintiff without tools to reign-in untethered data. 
2. Drew Case 
On May 15, 2008, a grand jury indicted Lori Drew for violations of the CFAA.62 She used a made-up boy’s 
name (Joshua Evans) to establish a phony MySpace account.63 She used the account to befriend a thirteen year 
old girl and, at Evan’s behest, goaded her into committing suicide.64 The U.S. Attorney prosecuted Drew and a 
jury convicted her of a crime, but the court set aside the conviction.65  
 
The court found that criminalizing the use of a web site gave the CFAA too broad a reach, that the verdict 
invested the police with too much power, and that the verdict gave too little notice to citizens using the internet.66  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54
 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1998). 
55
 Multiven, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 889. 
56
 Shamrock Food Co. v. Gast, 535 F.Supp. 2d 962, 963 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
57
 Id.  
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. at 968. 
62
 Chunga, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: How computer Science Can Help with the Problem of Over Breath, 24 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233 (2010). 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. 
66
 U.S. v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 464, 467 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
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But, having said that, there is something eerie, unsettling, and distasteful about the outcome. If laws facilitate 
healthy interactions between human beings, laws and their interpretations that facilitate unhealthy interactions 
are wrong.67 
3. Sloan Case 
Suzanne Sloan was a patient in a Virginia hospital.68 Slovanna Sloan was a hospital employee.69 Because of their 
name similarities and identical birthdates, Slovanna stole Suzanne’s identity to make money. Slovanna spent the 
loot (Suzanne’s identity) on loans, new credit cards, cash advances, and services totaling $30,000.70 Suzanne 
discovered the theft in January 2004. She notified the police, Equifax, and other consumer credit reporting 
agencies.71 She called her creditors; completed notarized forms about these acts; and sent them to everybody to 
correct her credit history.72  
 
Equifax assured Suzanne that it would do everything to correct her credit history.73 But that promise was 
never kept. When Suzanne applied for credit, she was rebuffed by creditors and banks.74 More than thirteen 
months after reporting the theft, Suzanne battled Equifax.75  
 
There were twenty four erroneous accounts in her credit report.76 Equifax removed twenty two of them.77 
Two months later Suzanne wrote a letter contesting the outstanding accounts. From that skirmish she unearthed 
the fact that Equifax (for whatever reason) had restored the twenty two deleted accounts.78  
 
After a twenty months effort to correct her credit report Suzanne filed a Fair Credit Reporting Act complaint 
against Equifax.79 The case went to trial. The jury returned a verdict for Suzanne, ordering Equifax to pay 
$106,000 in damages for economic loss and $245,000 for mental anguish, humiliation, and emotional distress.80 
4. . Russian Case 
In the year 2000, Russian hackers took apart American businesses. They stole trade secrets from company 
computers and threatened to make public the cache. They made no effort to conceal their identity. Because there 
was no cybercrime-related extradition treaty between the Russian Confederation and the United States, they did 
what they wished with impunity.81  
 
The government lured the hackers to the United States. They were invited to a bogus interview with a fake 
computer company in Seattle, Washington. Once there, they demonstrated their hacking skills on laptops rigged 
with FBI software.82 The gadgets captured the hackers’ user names, passwords to the Russian server, and tools of 
their trade. With this evidence in hand, the FBI arrested the Russians; indicted, tried, and convicted one of them 
under the Economic Espionage Act.83  
                                                          
67
 Murphy, Lon Fuller and The Moral Value of the Rule of Law, 24 LAW & PHILOSOPHY 239, 242 (2005). 
68
 Sloan v. Equifax Info. Svcs. Inc., 510 F.3d 495, 498 (4th Cir. 2007). 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. 
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. 
79
 Id. 
80
 Id. 
81
 Brenner, supra note 44. 
82
 Id. 
83
 Id. 
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At trial, the defense counsel moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Supreme 
Court found that the Fourth Amendment did not extend to searches and seizures outside of the United States.84 
The Fourth Amendment protected citizens and resident aliens. Because non-citizens were beyond the scope of 
the 4th Amendment,85 the evidence could be used by the government to put them away.  
 
One hacker was acquitted of all charges and returned to Russia. The other hacker was convicted, served three 
years, and went home.86 Thereafter, the Russian Federal Security Service brought charges against the FBI case 
agent, working the Russian case, for mucking around in foreign computers. Although the American was never 
turned over to Russian authorities for prosecution, and no trial in absentia ever took place, Russian officials felt 
the charges were necessary to assert their sovereignty.87 
5. Fe Ye Case 
On November 23, 2001, federal authorities arrested Fe Ye and Ming Zong at the San Francisco International 
Airport. Fe Ye is a U.S. citizen and Ming Zong is a permanent resident.88 Both had tickets for a flight to the 
People’s Republic of China and had corporate trade secrets in their possession.89 The U.S. government knew 
they were going to give the trade secrets to a government-funded Chinese corporation.90 Charges were brought 
against them under the Economic Espionage Act. Ye and Zong plead guilty to the charge of economic 
espionage.91  
6. The Gang Case 
On August 4, 2011, New York authorities indicted six members of a of an identity theft and cybercrime gang for 
stealing one million dollars from 80 clients of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank. The indicted were accused of harvesting 
information about people from the bank’s data base and, when the occasion allowed, assuming the identity of 
some Chase clients to pick their pockets. Some gang members used their positions at the bank to gather 
information from the bank’s system to withdraw funds from the accounts of unwitting patrons The accused were 
charged with computer trespass, conspiracy, larceny, and identity theft. If convicted, they face five years of 
imprisonment.92  
7. Koch Case 
Koch Industries assembled a website to spread controversial messages about global warming and climate 
change. Its foes (“John Does”) plumbed public records to assemble a phony website for Koch, in order to put 
Koch Industries in a false light.93 Koch spent time and money fixing its messages. Thereafter, it brought an 
action to recover damages under the CFAA.94  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
84
 Id. 
85
 Id. But, having said that, aliens can deploy the Fourth Amendment against outrageous government conduct (e.g., 
kidnapping) outside of the United States. U.S. v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974).  
86
 Id. 
87
 Id. 
88
 Lewis, supra note 30, at 207. There is an opinion. See U.S. v. Fei Ye, 436 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2006). 
89
 Id. 
90
 Id. 
91
 Id. 
92
 Debusmann, NYPD Busts Gang of Identity Thieves: Cyber-Criminals: DA’s Office, 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE7737DJ20110804. 
93
 Koch Indus., Inc. v. John Does, 2011 WL 177565 at *1 (D. Utah). 
94
 Id. at *2. 
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The court dismissed Koch’s action.95 Reconstituting public information to manufacture fake websites is 
suspect. When the setup addles the public (i.e., puts established-businesses in a false light), the deeds violate the 
CFAA.96 Owners must post password protection sentinels around their websites , use bold words to ward-off 
miscreants, and patter to the public about a website user assenting to terms and usage language.97 The court held 
that Koch could not recover damages, in this case, because it did nothing along these lines.98 
8. Multiven Case 
Cisco Systems, Inc. manufactures network switches, routers, and related services.99 Then, like now, Cisco 
Technology was  a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cisco Systems, Inc. As late as May, 2005, Peter Alfred Adekeye 
worked as an employee with Cisco Technology. On March 2, 2005, Adekeye founded a Delaware corporation.100 
Its name was Multiven, Inc.101 Multiven furnished services and maintenance support for routers and network 
systems, including products manufactured and placed into the stream of commerce by Cisco, Inc.102  
 
Adekeye terminated his employment with Cisco.103 Afterwards, Adekeye convinced a  Cisco employee to 
share his employee user name and password so Adekeye could plumb Cisco data for his business.104 When Cisco 
discovered the intrusion it brought an action to recover damages under the CFAA.105 Cisco sought money to 
cover the cost of staunching the flow of privileged information.106 
 
The court’s opinion was piled high with judicial hints. Poking into somebody’s computer is vile. Tricking a 
server is suspect. Poaching information crosses the line. When victims spend their money staunching the flow of 
information, the culprit must reimburse them. Cisco got damages.107 
9. Kai-Lo Hsu Case 
This was a disclosure case under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA).108 The question  was whether the 
government was obliged to divulge trade secrets under the guise of providing the defense with real evidence 
against their clients.109 The court said no. 
 
A federal grand jury indicted Kai-lo Hsu, Chester Ho, and Jessica Chou under the EEA.110 The indictment 
alleged that the defendants sought processes, methods, and formulas for the manufacture of Taxol, an anti-cancer 
drug manufactured and marketed by Bristol Myers Squibb.111 Hsu met with Hartmann, an undercover FBI agent, 
in Los Angeles, California.112 He outlined his Taiwanese firm’s interest.113 When Hartmann told Hsu that Bristol 
Myer would not share information about Taxol, Hsu told Hartmann that “we’ll get it another way.”114  
                                                          
95
 Id at *6-7. 
96
 Id. at *6 
97
 Id. 
98
 Id. 
99
 Multiven, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 889. 
100
 Id. 
101
 Id. 
102
 Id. 
103
 Id. at 892. 
104
 Id. 
105
 Id. at 894-95. 
106
 Id. at 895. 
107
 Id. 
108
 U.S. v. Kai-Lo Hsu, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Kai-Lo Hsu]. 
109
 Id. at 191. 
110
 Id. at 197. 
111
 Id. at 191.  
112
 Id. 
113
 Id. at 192. 
114
 Id. 
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The conspirators plied Hartmann to get the information. After some time had passed Hartmann arranged a 
bogus meeting to transfer something.  
 
When the meeting with Hartmann ended at a Los Angeles hotel, the FBI arrested the conspirators. Defense 
counsel demanded disclosure of the so-called trade secret, passed on to his clients, to authenticate (in his mind) 
what they were caught holding.115 If the data was bogus, counsel said, he was going to use legal impossibility as 
a defense.116  
 
Because Congress denied defense counsel the option to use legal impossibility to mount a defense, the 
government was precluded from disclosing trade secrets under the guise of affording defendants evidence 
against them.117  
 
EEA’s legislative history was clear with regard to attempt and conspiracy cases.118 Other defenses like 
entrapment and outrageous conduct wouldn’t suffice to wrench information from the government.119 Under 
section 1832(a)(4)-(5), government need not prove trade secrets to get convictions.120 Under section 1835, 
federal courts retain the power to protect trade secrets throughout when defense counsel sought them under other 
guises.121  
10. Aleynikov Case 
 
At the time, Sergey Aleynikov was a software innovator, systems engineer, and an employee of Goldman 
Financial Services (“Goldman”).122 Goldman purchased and tweaked a system, using information and 
algorithms, to execute internet trades in the stock market.123 Goldman hid its scheme and posted sentinels to 
preclude public scrutiny. Aleynikov was acquainted with the system and knew how it worked.124 During 
Aleynikov’s employment he downloaded the system’s codes, beamed them to himself in Germany, and hid what 
he’d done from Goldman.125 Sometime thereafter, Aleynikov met Teza, a trading firm and a soon-to-be 
employer.126 Aleynikov brought his laptop and a flash drive containing Goldman’s codes to share his loot with 
Teza.127 Because the acts were wrongdoing, and Aleynikov got caught doing them, he was arrested and indicted 
by authorities for crimes under the National Stolen Properties Act (“NSPA”), the EEA, and the CFAA.128 
 
Aleynikov moved to dismiss the indictment. The counts, counsel said, weren’t accompanied by plain, 
concise, and definite statements of essential facts for each charge.129 Indictments, he claimed, put people on 
notice about suspected crimes. They parrot statutory language and, hopefully, carry sufficient facts to make it 
likely (in the court’s mind) that a crime was committed.130 Courts must dismiss indictments when the accused’s  
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deeds are neither covered  nor endorsed by some statute.131 Aleynikov maintained that this was his case. His 
deeds weren’t crimes and the indictment against him should be dismissed. 
 
Generally speaking, courts should follow the rules of statutory construction and, thereafter, parse a 
statute, to resolve a problem like this. When Congress omits a definition for a contested term ordinary meaning 
should be ascribed to statutory language.132 Courts should ignore legislative history when the word or words in 
question are clear, plain, and unambiguous.133 The question was whether Goldman’s codes were “goods” under 
the NSPA? The court said yes.  
 
Under the statute, when goods (an undefined term in the act) was given its ordinary meaning (anything 
subject to commerce),134 Goldman’s codes were goods. If they were lifted from Goldman’s place of business and 
transported by Aleynikov across state lines, the deeds ascribed to the accused constitute crimes135.  
 
There were tougher questions under a different statute that the court had to address. Was Goldman’s 
source-code a product under the EEA?136 Was Aleynikov’s delivery of the code to Teza a crime under the 
EEA?137 The court said yes . If Goldman’s source-code made its trading system go, then the source-code was a 
product.138 EEA defined them by example (e.g., products, codes, programs, squirreled away from public 
scrutiny, and surrounded by sentinels).139 Since that is what we had under these facts, and evidence that 
Aleynikov delivered them to Teza, the accused’s deeds were crimes. 
 
But holding Aleynikov accountable under the CFAA was tricky business. The statute criminalized 
electronic trespassing.140 Since misuse of looted info was beyond the scope of the act,141  the court dismissed the 
CFAA count.   
  
11. Paradigm Alliance Case 
 
Paradigm and Celeritas were parties to a joint venture.142 Each placed their business interests in the other’s hands 
on an understanding that they would nurture their relationship. One day, long after their relationship was 
underway, a Celebritas’ employee hacked Paradigm’s computer.143 He looted information from the machine and 
poured the booty into a patent application for new type of software.144 Celebritas was aware of the hack but said 
nothing.145 After the joint venture ended, Celebritas’ employee sold the patent application to Celebritas to 
develop, own, and market for his clients.146 When Paradigm got wind of the deeds, it brought an action to  
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recover damages.147 The theories for the case were breach of contract, breach of a fiduciary relationship, 
misappropriation of trade secrets, and a CFAA violation.148 
 
Under joint ventures parties must nurture their relationship. Regrettably, that did not happen in this case.  
Hacking was a breach of contract.149 Looting an instrument and concealing the theft was a breach.150 Knowing 
about a theft and saying nothing was  breach of a fiduciary duty.151 Pouring looted material into a patent 
application that got assigned to the defendant was a breach.152 Rummaging through Paradigm’s computer was a 
violation of the CFAA.153 
12. Combs Case 
 
Kelli Combs owned five internet websites.154 James Diaz stole them.155 He hacked her email account; inserted 
his password; obliterated Comb’s access to the sites; and made them his own so he could milk them without 
obstruction for money.156 In a lawsuit Comb’s claimed that there was a conversion of her websites and multiple 
violations of the CFAA.157 She deployed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the California Penal 
Code against the defendant to get relief.158  
 
In California, Combs went about establishing Diaz’s identity.159 He was served with process by publication. 
When he failed to make a court appearance, the court entered a default judgment.160 The district court judge said 
that all factual allegations were taken as true.161 In California, internet domain names amounted to property and 
served as a basis for a conversion claim in torts.162 Plaintiff had to show (as Combs did in this case) ownership, 
or a right to control, wrongful disposition, and damages. Since the allegations (taken as truths) established that, 
there was conversion.163  
 
The measure of damages, chimed the court, was the value of the property at the time of conversion and the 
amount spent to rescue it from Diaz.164 The court gave Combs a sum equal to the money spent to redesign her 
websites, publish corrective advertisements, purchase and register her new websites, and profits.165 
4.2 Troubling Stuff 
What’s troubling about the rubbish is the legalese courts must use to resolve problems.166 Judges must: (1) 
analyze cases; (2) use pertinent words in statutes; (3) give them their ordinary meaning; (4) give into the plain  
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meaning rule to rationalize what’s being done; (5) utilize legislative history; (6) read and synthesize house and 
senate reports; (7) adopt the reasons for certain expressions highlighted in legislative history; (8) implement 
legislative aspirations; (9) make use of pari materia to determine when two statutes on the same subject are 
compatible; and (10) adopt presidential missives about cybercrime legislation to cypher the meaning of a 
particular act.167 
 
 The CFAA arms the government with the power to prosecute computer crimes. It covers stealing, 
vandalizing computers, and wrenching control of high technology to disrupt everybody’s life.168 The statutory 
language is awful: 
     
1. To successfully bring an action under section 1030(a)(4), plaintiffs must show that defendants: 
accessed a “protected computer” without authorization, or exceeded an authorization that was 
granted, knowingly, with the intent to defraud, to make money, causing a loss over one year of 
$5,000.169  
 
2. To successfully bring an action under 1030(a)(5), plaintiffs must show that defendants: 
accessed a “protected computer” without authority, intentionally and “as a result of such 
conduct caused damage.”170 
 
What constitutes a “protected computer” under the CFAA? Protected computers are tools suitable for internet 
use.171 What does “without authorization” mean? “Without authorization” occurs when a person rummages 
through computers without permission (or after permission is rescinded).172 What’s the meaning of the words 
“knowledge and intent”? It’s wrongdoing.173 What is the meaning of “damages” and “loss”? It’s vandalizing 
data, systems, programs, and information.174 Loss is the cost of repair.175 
 
EEA language is no better. Judges and clerks battle awkward language to pound-out results in economic 
espionage cases. “Trade secrets” are defined by examples (all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, 
technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, 
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible 
or intangible, and whether stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, 
photographically, or in writing.)176 The material must have intrinsic value, squirreled away from scrutiny, and 
surrounded by sentinels.177 The government’s obligation is to do whatever to preserve a business’s trade 
secrets.178  
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4.3. Solutions. 
 
a) How should we police this mess? What are the solutions? We could say: Cyberspace is an ocean. 
Hackers are pirates.179 Since they are enemies of all mankind and difficult to capture, any country 
holding one has the authority to try them.180 A private cause of action against a hacker must be beyond 
conjecture. The deed or deeds must be universally wrong. Exhaustion of domestic criminal remedies 
against the hacker, or inaction by the executive branch, are ways to start the ball rolling.  
 
b) We should use statutes against hackers.181 The CFAA covers breaking and entering by computer.182 It’s 
using this instrument beyond the scope of one’s authority to collect national security information,183 
information in financial records, or information of a department or agency of the United States.184 Any 
unauthorized entry is crimes.185 Compromising an employer-employee relationship to collect 
somebody’s trade secrets is a crime. Using somebody else’s computers to trick a server into divulging 
information without authorization is a crime.186 
 
c) We could put robotic cops on the business scene: computer software bearing the names of employees 
using a firm’s computer system to access the internet. While all employees would share in the use of the 
business system, the software would guarantee that the files stored in a computer belonged to the user. 
There would be access control lists for everybody. The software would code files downloaded from the 
internet for people to read, edit, and pass on to others. The scheme presupposes that downloaders will 
read and brand their files at the end of a session or the software will brand it for them to restrain use.187  
5.  Commodification 
For the moment, information is free and everybody possesses some. Collectors in cyberspace (e.g., newspapers) 
should brand their storage and price the stuff for consumption. Seekers would buy bits at nodes to regulate the 
flow. Downloaders would need to mark their harvests for reading, use, edit, or transfer to others. Because 
cyberspace is lawless, some (if not all of cyberspace) would be ceded to software engineers and counter-
engineers (beat cops), to police against theft and hawked encryptions (Illustration A) that benefit everybody.188 
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There is this glob with nodes around the rim. People 
use the nodes to harvest information from the far 
corners of the world . There are software creators and 
systems engineers (experts) to police the traffic. 
Branded info is news harvested by online newspapers. 
Consumers spend money to read the caches. 
6. Crime 
What should we do about crime? Phishing (e.g., phone scams),189 fishing,190 and auction fraud constitute 
crimes.191 Using computers and GPS systems to locate password-free servers is suspect. Selling the collections to 
others should be a crime.  
 
Using computers to poach information from other computers is suspect. Poaching classified information is a 
crime.192 Using thumb drives to download business secrets is suspect. Spiriting the loot out of the country is a 
crime.193 Using personal information to assume another’s identity is suspect. Using another’s identity to get 
loans and credit cards is a crime.194  
 
Using a phony identity to establish accounts with Facebook is suspect. Using it to bring about the death of 
another is a crime195 (Illustration B). Borrowing a user’s name and password is wrong. Using them to poach 
confidential information is suspect. Using the loot to feather one’s nest is a crime.196 
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We should outlaw back-dooring (bits of program code 
written into an application that grants the programmer 
access to a program without going through normal security 
controls); brute force attacks (capturing encrypted messages 
and, thereafter, imposing interrogation software on the 
messages to break their codes); sniffing (illicitly inserting 
software somewhere in a network to capture user passwords 
as they pass through the system); and spoofing (posing as 
the user to rummage through her computer).197 
7. Damages 
Hackers do untold damage. Truth is the first casualty. Nobody believes that users of cyber space can transfer 
stuff to others without compromising security and confidential information.198 The debris left behind by today’s 
thieves is everywhere. MCI lost $50 million when hackers downloaded more than 50,000 credit cards.199 
Citibank lost $10 million when its computer network was compromised by a crime group in Russia.200 Of 1,290 
businesses surveyed by Ernst and Young, nearly half were victims of information security breaches.201 Seventy 
percent of respondents reported serious hacking attacks.202 
8. Appeasement 
We can appease hackers by decriminalizing hacking.203 Business and security firms can sponsor hacker 
conventions, launch contests, and reward contestants for stratagems that penetrate, manipulate, and render 
understandable complicated business networks and security systems.204 The sponsors would have to announce 
hack-in-days, exposing networks or dummy networks to hacking.205 There would be guidelines for the contests 
and government oversight. Felons, people under federal indictment, and folks with seedy reputations would be 
excluded from these contests.206 Contestants would receive cash awards based upon milestones and  
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achievements in each contest.207 Sponsors would harvest knowledge provided by the contestants to patch their 
networks and make them better.208  
9. Benefit 
All this would leave our criminal laws intact; disaggregate the hacker community; and last but not least, de-
stigmatize hackers operating without a malicious intent.209 So-called look-and-see hacking and other forms of 
hacking, motivated by bragging rights, would get channeled into contests (dissipating the need for and the use of 
law enforcement resources.)210 Contests would  provide a forum for hackers to pursue their curiosity, think 
creatively, and make technological discoveries that benefit everybody.211  
10. Market Scheme 
The Federal Communications Commission could erect hacking standards (using approved firewall protection 
schemes for the private sector) and caps. The schemes would be subject to written comments under the Federal 
Administrative Procedure Act before they took effect and got imposed upon internet service providers (ISPs).  
 
Providers would have to pledge to do whatever, using all available technology,  to keep hacking below the 
caps. At the end of a year, assuming ISP hacking protection software was within standard, and malicious hacking 
attempts remain below the caps, the differences would get banked by the ISP or sold to others who broke their 
vows.  
 
The difference between usage and cap would be currency. Owners could buy from others to make up 
deficiencies, or sell their excess to others. When the differences turned scarce and, thinking fortuitously, too 
expensive for ISPs to purchase from others, vow breakers would have to pay fines to the government (amounting 
to a percentage of the cost of repair.)  
 
This scheme is likened to a third party beneficiary contract. Because ISPs and the FCC are invested in one 
another’s success, and have the wherewithal to do something profound about hacking, everybody (to include the 
public) benefits.  
11. Another View 
People want privacy—the right to be left alone.212 They want sentinels in torts, property, contracts, trusts and 
constitutional law to keep intruders away.213 People can’t publish private letters because somebody owns 
them.214 People can’t publish a distinguished Prof’s lectures because she owns them.215 Artists can use common  
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law copyright to prevent others from publishing their works.216 People have the power to restrict use of their 
names and images for money.217 They can exclude folk from their dwellings,218 deny the government the option 
to rummage through their household belongings,219 and last, but not least, deny officials the option to conduct 
electronic surveillance of their home without probable cause.220 
 
But these sentinels are ill-suited for cyberspace.221 This realm is different.222 People want to protect their 
identity, solitude and anonymity. Some want mild forms of libertarianism to minimize government interaction 
with the internet.223 Others want authorities to draw statutory lines beyond which internet users cannot go.224  
 
If emailers make a representation that “they’ll do x” and it’s accompanied by evidence that “they intend to do 
y,” that is fraud in fact.225 If they type a lie (e.g., “I am x and authorized to do something beneficial for you”), 
that is fraud in inducement.226 These deeds sound in tort and contracts. They are crimes. When tricksters use 
another’s user id and password to circumvent software barricading websites, the deeds merit punishment.227 
12. Parting Thought  
In 2011, computers are things. They accommodate user ids, passwords, recognition devices, and software. All 
software comes with a license.228 Misuse amounts to a breach. Software licensors can shut down licensees,229 put 
them on a black list and, in appropriate cases, pursue a private cause of action for damages.230  
 
Hackers commit crimes when they send friendly emails with attachments and websites bearing malware 
(software that steals information from other computers).231 People commit crimes when they insert malware  
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into a herd of computers, all resting until the hacker tells them what to do. Hackers commit crimes when they 
order computers to make simultaneous demands that force targeted servers to shut down.232  
 
Stated boldly, hackers shouldn’t disturb another’s solitude. Something must be done to preserve anonymity. 
A lot should be done to protect people’s identity, wealth, sense of self-worth, and privacy. Be it physical reality 
or virtual reality, rummaging through a person’s belongings is a tort.233 
 
These days, everybody’s endowed with the option to spy on others or do nothing. If a person chooses the first 
option and ploughs through materials another controls, and assumes others will leave alone, its wrongdoing. If 
the deed peeks ire;234 that is, makes the victim angry because he’s screened the stuff from view and the public, as 
a matter of practice, has gone about its business without disturbing the stuff, there is a tort. Producing evidence 
about compromised credit card information, trade secrets, personal correspondence, and exploitable social 
security numbers warrants damages. Plaintiffs should get a pile of money equal to the sum spent to clean up the 
mess.235 
13. Conclusion 
America is rife with modern day fears, anxiety and guilt. For some, life is too fast for them. In the Twenty-First 
Century, man is a wildcard and Earth’s latest experiment. Having assaulted mother-nature and discovered that 
nature will push back, man has created a parallel universe where he can do anything. Problems arise when man 
drops in and out of cyberspace to do evil. Something must be done about the wickedness. Some ideas have been 
proposed in this work to deal with irritating and outrageous conduct. Time will tell us what we’ll do. 
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